The Senate’s preliminary report into the failures of the US Secret Service in connection with the attempted assassination of Donald Trump on July 13 has been released. Reading through the shocking details, it is tough to believe that the failures were solely due to incompetence. The agency neglected its responsibilities so completely that it is surprising that more people were not killed.
So what happened? In the lead-up to the rally, there was essentially one-way communication that went from local law enforcement to the Secret Service, rather than the other way around. On the day of the rally, all efforts and communications were completely siloed. There was no clear chain of command for the Secret Service team, and there were numerous technical failures.
RELATED: RedState’s coverage of the July 13 attack
It’s tough to pick the most jaw-dropping revelation, but what happened to the Secret Service’s C-UAS (Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System) is a robust candidate and a good example of the Keystone Cops nature of the Secret Service’s operation. The USSS deployed a C-UAS for the rally, and that operator requested additional C-UAS equipment and personnel multiple times in the days leading up to the rally, but was denied. Trump’s Secret Service department asked the USSS advance team for a counter surveillance unit, and the advance team made that request to its superiors, but it was denied.
So on July 13, an agent was on the scene who had only three months of experience with the C-UAS drone. The C-UAS system was not functional until 4:33 p.m., after the assassin flew his drone. What did the agent have to do when he couldn’t get the C-UAS to work?
Because there was no backup system, the USSS agent responsible for monitoring C-UAS capabilities at the July 13 rally called the toll-free technical support hotline at 888 “to begin troubleshooting with the company,” which took several hours.
Several hours. Hours that could have been put to much better employ. In this case, I don’t blame the agent; I blame the agency leadership for failing to ensure that agents were thoroughly trained and competent in the employ of technology before they were deployed – solely – to protect a person like Donald Trump.
Due to the complete isolation of ground operations and communications prior to the rally, local law enforcement had no idea this C-UAS was to be deployed or that it would be unavailable for many hours. The Secret Service did not share its deployment plan with locals, nor did it request a copy of the locals’ plans. There were two separate communications centers at the rally, and the “primary means of communication between posts was the cell phone.” The Secret Service and local law enforcement were on different radio channels, and local law enforcement’s channels were recorded that day, but Secret Service’s were not. One USSS sniper said he was offered a local radio that day, but did not have time to pick it up because he was too busy repairing a USSS radio that was not working properly.
As it turned out, however, the only reason snipers were on site that day was because there was “credible intelligence of a threat” to Trump – but that threat did not come from Thomas Crooks.
The July 13 rally marked the first time a USSS sniper team was assigned to protect someone other than the president, vice president, or a presidential candidate officially nominated by his or her party.
The rally took place one day before the Republican National Convention was scheduled to take place in Milwaukee. In other words, this happened to be the last opportunity for a sniper to take out Trump without having to deal with counter-snipers. Or at least it should have been. Would Crooks have known this, and would he have known that the plans had changed? If he had known, he might not have known that the plans had changed:
According to the deputy director of the USSS’s Office of Protective Operations, the decision to deploy snipers to the events surrounding former President Trump was made sometime in the first week of July. Almost all of the USSS personnel interviewed by the committee – including the Intelligence Advance Agent and the Special Agent in Charge (SAIC) of the Pittsburgh Field Office – said they had no credible intelligence of a threat.
If agents had known that there was credible intelligence about a threat, they might have been able to protect Trump on the ground a little more aggressively.
Although USSS agents noticed a person with a rangefinder near the AGR building 27 minutes before the shooting, were informed of a person on the roof of the AGR two minutes before the shooting, and a sniper saw local police officers running toward the AGR building with guns drawn shortly before the shooting, why was Trump not taken off the stage?
The USSS counter sniper told the committee that while the sight of police officers with guns drawn “increased the threat level,” the thought of notifying someone to get Trump off the stage “was out of the question.” [his ]Spirit.”
Why not? It would have taken only seconds to radio that to the rest of the team.
At its core, this issue highlights a massive problem with the leadership of the USSS and its decision-making process. They appear to be incapable of making decisions or taking responsibility:
USSS advance agents explained to the committee that planning and security decisions were made jointly and that there was no agreement as to who at USSS was responsible for final approval or decisions.
As stated in the report, here are the Significant deficiencies identified by the Committee:
1. The USSS failed to clearly define responsibilities for planning and security at the July 13 rally.
- USSS personnel responsible for planning ahead for the July 13 rally denied personal responsibility for any planning or security deficiencies and denied blame.
- USSS advance guard agents told the committee that planning and security decisions are made jointly and there is no specific individual responsible for approval.
2. USSS failed to provide effective coverage of the AGR building.
- USSS considered the AGR building problematic due to the line of sight from the roof to the stage, but took no steps to implement adequate safety measures.
- The USSS was aware that local snipers planned to locate in the AGR building and expressed no objections or concerns about this placement.
- USSS personnel, including the leader of the USSS Counter Sniper Team, did not enter the AGR building or go to the roof prior to the shooting.
- A USSS counter-sniper team, whose duties included scanning the area around the AGR building for threats, had a narrow view of the AGR roof.
3. The USSS failed to effectively coordinate with state and local law enforcement agencies.
- The USSS did not provide specific instructions to either state or local partners on how to cover the AGR building, including the positioning of local snipers.
- The USSS did not adequately consider the operational plans of state and local law enforcement agencies.
- (*13*) at the July 13 rally were isolated and the USSS did not ensure that information could be shared in real time with local law enforcement partners.
4. The USSS failed to provide resources for the July 13 rally that could have increased security.
- The USSS rejected specific requests for additional capacity for Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-UAS) and a liaison for a Counter Assault Team.
- A USSS counter surveillance unit – which could have helped monitor the outer perimeter, which included the AGR building – was not requested by the USSS advance guard agents.
- The USSS failed to inform key personnel about the suspect and failed to take action to ensure the safety of former President Trump.
- At approximately 5:45 p.m., USSS personnel were informed that local police had observed a suspicious person using a rangefinder near the AGR building. By 5:52 p.m., at least eight USSS personnel had been informed.
- Approximately two minutes before the shots were fired, the USSS security room at the rally site was notified that a person was on the roof of the AGR building.
- Shortly before the shots were fired, a USSS sniper observed local officers running toward the AGR building with weapons drawn.
It’s difficult to find words that adequately describe what an epic failure the Secret Service’s operation in Butler was. If they had wanted Trump assassinated, would they have done anything differently? It seems that without the eagle-eyed residents and local law enforcement officers who took their job of protection seriously, the crooks would have had enough time to get one solid shot at Trump – and this country would be in utter chaos, or worse.
Just this morning, President Biden said on The View that Donald Trump “doesn’t believe in democracy” and made a motion as if he was squashing a bug after Whoopi Goldberg compared Trump to an insect, and Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo called on MSNBC to “wipe out” Trump for good. Hearing those words and reading the Senate report, it’s difficult to believe that the Biden administration did not want this assassination attempt and that it should not succeed.
EDITOR’S NOTE: Without independent journalists covering the Secret Service’s failures on July 13 and beyond, and without conservative media pressuring Congress, we might not have reports like the one the Senate released Wednesday morning. The Biden/Harris administration would love nothing more than to silence us, either through legislation or by bankrupting us through Big Tech censorship. The only way we can survive their ongoing attacks and fight back is through direct financial support from our VIP members. If you are not already a RedState VIP member, Please join today – And Use discount code FIGHT for 60% off.
